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Abstract
For a market of horizontal product differentiation, the paper examines the effects
of the level of competition on the ﬁrm’s decision between a product and process
innovation. When ﬁrms have to choose between the two types of innovation, it is
demonstrated that both ﬁrms undertake the product innovation when the competi-
tion is intense. For intermediate levels of competition, the ﬁrms choose different
investment projects, and for less intense competition, the ﬁrms pursue cost–reducing
innovations. When ﬁrms may undertake both innovations, they decide to undertake
a mixture of the innovations depending on the innovation cost structure. Again, the
ﬁrms are willing to incur higher costs into product innovations, when the competition
is initially intense.
JEL–Classiﬁcation: L13
Keywords: Product innovation; Process innovation; Horizontal product differentia-
tion
1 Introduction
The interrelation of the market structure of an industry and the R&D investment has
received much attention over decades.1 Earlier works were mostly concerned with in-
vestments in R&D in homogeneous product markets (for an excellent survey see e.g.
Reinganum, 1992). Within this strand of literature, the effect of the degree of compe-
tition on the incentives to innovate were widely discussed. In his seminal contribution,
Schumpeter (1942) argued in favour of the monopoly while Arrow (1962) established the
reverse proposition. Only recently, this question has been addressed in a framework of a
differentiated product market.2
 The author wishes to thank Stephanie Rosenkranz, Walter Elberfeld as well as the participants of the
research colloquium of Prof. von Weizs¨ acker for helpful comments on an earlier version. The usual
disclaimer applies. Financial aid from the State of North–Rhine Westfalia is gratefully acknowledged.
1 There are many aspects of market structure. Here, it is used as a synonym for the degree of competition.
2 Bester and Petrakis (1993) e.g. for cost–reducing innovations in a model of horizontal product differen-
tiation. Among others, Bonanno and Haworth (1998) and Boone (2001) consider process innovations in
a model of vertical product differentiation. See e.g. Greenstein and Ramey (1998), Shaked and Sutton
(1990), andRosenkranz(1995)foramodelofverticallydifferentiatedproductsandproductinnovations.
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Most contributions have focused on either a product or a process innovation or else
have left unspeciﬁed, which particular type of innovation is studied. However, it seems to
be more realistic to consider situations, in which a ﬁrm has the choice at least between a
product and a process innovation. This framework is a prerequisite to understand which
factors let ﬁrms undertake R&D projects aiming at a product or at a process innovation.
The principal purpose of the present paper is to enquire into the role of the intensity of
competition on the ﬁrms’ decision to engage in a product or process innovation. To my
notion, only two papers have addressed this question so far: Bonanno and Haworth (1998)
and Rosenkranz (1996). Bonanno and Haworth (1998) consider a market of vertical prod-
uct differentiation. The incentive of one ﬁrm to innovate are compared for a low degree
of (Cournot) competition and a more intense (Bertrand) competition. They demonstrate
that the high quality ﬁrm is apt to choose the product innovation in a less intense state
of (Cournot) competition, while it is inclined to pursue the process innovation in a more
dense (Bertrand) competition. For the low quality ﬁrm, the reverse result appears.
The paper of Rosenkranz (1996) considers a duopoly in a horizontally differentiated
product market with Cournot competition. In her contribution, the ﬁrms may carry out
both, process and product innovations, at the same time. She studies the inﬂuence of the
consumers’ willingness to pay in the sense of the market size as well as the ﬁrms’ decision
to form research joint ventures on the ﬁrms’ research portfolio. In addition, the welfare
effects of R&D–cooperations are considered. The main result of Rosenkranz related to
the present work is that the ﬁrms will always pursue both, product and process innovations
at the same time.
The present paper is based on a Hotelling (1929)–type duopoly model with Bertrand
competition. In this framework, the intensity of competition can be measured by the
distance of the variety’s location on the variety line. Here, the possibility arises to consis-
tently study all possible degrees of competition from a local monopoly to perfect compe-
tition. The question of the effects of the degree of competition on the ﬁrms’ investment
pattern is studied in three successive steps. First, it is assumed that ﬁrms have to decide
between a product and a process innovation, where the investment costs are negligible.
Here, itcanbedemonstratedthat(1)bothﬁrmspursueprocessinnovations, whenthelevel
of competition is low, (2) the ﬁrm choose different types of innovations in an intermediate
intensity of competition, and (3) both ﬁrms engage in product innovations when compe-
tition is intense. Subsequently, non–negligible investment costs are considered. It will be
shown that under reasonable conditions the results obtained under negligible investment
costs continue to hold. Finally, a setup is studied, in which ﬁrms may carry out process
and product innovations at the same time. Restrictions on the investment costs functions
can be established, so that ﬁrms indeed carry out a mixture of product and process inno-
vations. If those restrictions are not met, ﬁrms will undertake only one type of innovation
or none at all. In addition, it can be shown that the optimal product innovation positively
depends on the willingness to pay for a variety differing from the most preferred one and
positively on the initial degree of competition.
Thepaperisorganisedasfollows: Section2introducesthemainassumptionsconcern-
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section 3 characterises the Nash equilibrium in prices for all possible combinations of
the two types of innovation. Then, section 4 introduces the framework, in which both
ﬁrms can choose between a process and a product innovation and the innovation costs are
negligible. Section 5 assumes strictly positive investment costs and establishes conditions
under which the innovation pattern for negligible innovation costs re–emerges. Section 6
studies the ﬁrms’ decision when both types of innovation can be pursued at the same time
and section 7 provides a summary.
2 The Basic Framework
The ﬁrms’ investment problem is addressed in a two–stage non–cooperative game
of perfect information. Consider a market of a horizontally differentiated consumption
good. There is a continuum of potential varieties f with total mass one, i.e. f 2 [0;1]. In
the initial situation, two ﬁrms A and B are operating in the market. They produce speciﬁc
varieties fi, i = A;B. The actually produced varieties can be illustrated by points fA and
fB on the unit line. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that fA  fB.
At the beginning of the ﬁrst stage, ﬁrms decide on their research projects. They can
pursue a process or a project innovation. The former aims at reducing the production
costs, whereas the latter introduces a new variety, while the old one is abandoned. In the
remainder of this stage, the projects are carried out and completed at the end of the ﬁrst
stage.3 For simplicity, it is posited that neither project is subject to uncertainty. At the
begin of the second stage, the ﬁrms observe the opponent’s investment decision. They
simultaneously choose prices and realise proﬁts and the game ends.
As usual, the Nash equilibria (NE) are determined by applying the concept of sub-
game perfection. Therefore, the second–stage price equilibrium is determined ﬁrst. Sub-
sequently the ﬁrst–stage investment problem is analysed. Here, three different scenarios
are considered: (1) Firms can undertake only one research project, so that they have to de-
cidebetweenthetwotypes. Theinvestmentcosts I aresupposedtobenegligible, i.e. I =0
is imposed. (2) Again, it is posited that the research projects are mutually excluding. The
investment costs are identical for both projects, but strictly positive. This situation may
arise when ﬁrms have a certain investment budget to spend. When the research projects
have a ﬁxed or minimum scale, they have to choose between the two types of innovation.
This case may be associated to short–term investment projects. (3) Firms may undertake
process and product innovations at the same time. They also determine the scale of each
investment. As ﬁrms have a greater choice to specify the investment plans, this case may
serve as an example for long–term research projects.
3 In the ﬁrst stage, all innovation activities necessary to either offer a new variety or to produce more
efﬁciently are carried out. Therefore, one may think of the ﬁrst stage as comprising several time periods,
during which the old varieties are produced using the old technology.4 Pia Weiß
3 The Price Equilibrium
There is a continuum of consumers with total mass one. They have different pref-
erences regarding the most preferred variety. Let c 2 [0;1] denote the consumers’ most
favoured variety and let c be uniformly distributed. It is assumed that the consumers’
preferences can be represented by
U(c;fi;pi) = r t(c fi)2  pi; (1)
where pi denotes the price of variety fi. The term t(c fi)2 is the disutility, which a
consumer experiences by not purchasing his favoured variety. The parameter t can be
interpreted as an consumer’s willingness to pay sub–ideal varieties. Then, the parameter
r is the reservation price for the individual’s most preferred variety. Hence, if pi > r even
the consumer favouring the variety fi is not willing to buy it. Henceforward, it is assumed
that r is sufﬁciently large, so that every consumer purchases one or the other variety, i.e.
the market is fully covered.4
Consumer ¯ c is indifferent between buying variety fA and fB if both options yield the








With fA fB and the market is fully covered, consumers c< ¯ c purchase variety fA while
consumers c  ¯ c buy variety fB. Accordingly, the ﬁrms’ demand functions are given by














The production technology is assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale and to be
independent of the particular variety offered, so that the unit costs ci are constant. To char-
acterise the price equilibrium for all possible investment decisions, unit costs may diverge
indicating that ﬁrms apply different technologies. Then, the ﬁrms’ proﬁt function can be
written as pi = (pi ci)di. As usual, the NE in prices is a pair of functions depending on











The price functions have the following properties: The price of both varieties is negatively
correlated with the intensity of competition, i.e. with the degree of product differentiation
4 Peitz (1999) pointed out that the consumers’ demand may also be restricted by their income. He demon-
strated that a NE may fail to exist in such situations. Clearly, the non–existence problem is also relevant
for the present model. Accordingly, a sufﬁciently large income is supposed as well.
5 Due to the assumption that the reservation price r is sufﬁciently large, so that the entire market is
covered, the indifferent consumer realises a positive utility.Product and Process Innovations in Horizontally Differentiated Markets 5
fB  fA. In the extreme case of identical varieties (fA = fB), the price functions are
identical to those obtained in a standard Bertrand game. In this situation, the ﬁrms charge
at unit costs if both ﬁrms use identical technologies. Otherwise, the ﬁrm employing the
less efﬁcient technology drops out and the more efﬁcient ﬁrms supplies the entire market.
With the equilibrium prices given in (2) and (3), the equilibrium proﬁts net of the













where Dk  cB cA. These proﬁt functions deﬁne the payoffs for all possible investment
activities undertaken in the ﬁrst stage.6
4 Negligible Investment Costs
To yield comparable results for the three alternative scenarios, the situation is regarded
to be identical at the beginning of the ﬁrst stage. In particular, it is assumed that both
ﬁrms initially use identical technologies, i.e. cA = cB = c. For notational convenience, it
is additionally posited that history led to a symmetric market structure: at the begin of the
ﬁrst stage, ﬁrm B0s variety is fB =1 fA. Then, the assumption of fA fB implies that fA
takes values in the interval [0;1=2]. Due to the symmetry assumption, a particular value
of fA also contains information on the intensity of competition. Clearly, the lower the
degree of product differentiation, the higher is the intensity of competition. As the former
is (1 2fA) in the symmetric setup, the intensity of competition is negatively correlated
with fA.
Inthescenariostudiedinthissection, ﬁrmscanundertakeonlyoneinvestmentproject.
As the investment costs are regarded to be zero (IA = IB = 0), the option ’do not invest
at all’ is not relevant here (see the next section). As a consequence, the ﬁrms will either
invest in a process or in a product innovation. When aiming at the former option, the
ﬁrm produces with a new technology in the second stage, which reduces the unit costs
by a ﬁxed amount of d. If a ﬁrm undertakes a product innovation, it is in the position
to offer the proﬁt maximising variety by the end of the ﬁrst stage. The old variety is
abandoned. Due to the assumption that the market is initially fully covered, a ﬁrm cannot
gain a local monopoly position. Hence, product innovations are always non–drastic in the
presentmodel(cf. Rosenkranz(1996)). Bothprojectsarealikeinthesensethatneitherthe
outcome nor the time of completion are uncertain. The only distinguishing characteristics
of the two projects is the result itself.
Given that the investment costs are negligible, there are four potential equilibria:
6 Note that the ﬁrm using the less efﬁcient technology drops out whenever they initially produce identical
varieties (fA = fB). The remaining ﬁrm receives a positive proﬁt. This can directly be veriﬁed from
the proﬁt functions. Let cB < cA. Then, ﬁrm A exits the market and ﬁrm B’s proﬁt is derived with
( cB+tfB(4 fB))2=18tfB.6 Pia Weiß
(1) (np;np): Both ﬁrms undertake the product innovation. They produce the proﬁt
maximising varieties f
A and f
B employing the old technology, i.e. Dk = 0.
(2) (np;cr): Firm A produces a new variety f
A using the old technology while ﬁrm
B introduces a new technology and supplies the old variety 1 fA. Therefore,
Dk =  d < 0.
(3) (cr;np): Firm A introduces a new technology and ﬁrm B produces a new variety f
B,
so that Dk = d > 0.
(4) (cr;cr): Both ﬁrms implement a new technology. Since the cost reduction achieved
is identical for both ﬁrms, Dk = 0 holds true.
In general, the proﬁt maximising variety f
i may depend on the opponent’s investment
decision. To determine these optimal varieties, consider ﬁrst ﬁrm A’s situation in case (1)
or (2). As both ﬁrms behave rationally and anticipate the second–stage outcome, ﬁrm A’s
optimal choice f







(Dk+t(fB fA)(fB 2 3fA))  0: (6)
In case (1), ﬁrm B aims at introducing a new variety as well. Both ﬁrms employ the
old technology, so that Dk = 0. Since fA  fB, (6) holds with strict inequality for all
f
A 2 [0;1=2]. Therefore, ﬁrm A will offer f
A = 0 in the second stage. Consider now
case (2). Firm B implements a more efﬁcient technology, whereas ﬁrm A continues to
use the old one. The efﬁciency gain of ﬁrm A is Dk =  d < 0. Again, there is no f
A in
the relevant range, so that (6) is satisﬁed with equality. Firm A chooses f
A = 0. Due to
the symmetry of the model, ﬁrm B will produce f
B = 1, when introducing a new variety.
Hence, for the second stage, the ﬁrms’ optimal product choice is to seek the maximal
degree of differentiation.7
Given the optimal choices for the new varieties f
A and f
B, the payoffs realised in each
potential equilibrium can be speciﬁed. Using f
A = 0, f
B = 1, and the information on the
cost structure given in the four cases above, it can easily be veriﬁed from equations (4) and
(5) that the payoffs are symmetric in the following sense: in case (1) and (4) the opponents
realise identical proﬁts. Firm A’s and B’s proﬁt from investing into a process (product)
innovation are equivalent if the rival decides to undertake a product (process) innovation
(case (2) and (3)). Table 1 summarises the net–payoffs in a schematic manner. In general,
the payoffs pi are functions of the cost reduction achieved by a process innovation d and
of the variety initially produced by ﬁrm A.8 As the value of fA is also a measure of
7 Asitiswell–known, therearetwoopposingeffectsontheoptimalproductchoiceinthisclassofmodels.
One induces the ﬁrm to move to the centre of the line. This increases the demand as long as the market is
not fully covered. The second one causes the ﬁrm to choose products towards the end of the line. This
increases the degree of product differentiation and thereby enables the ﬁrms to charge higher prices.
As we presumed that the market is fully covered at the begin of the ﬁrst stage, the demand effect is
irrelevant.
8 As the initial market structure was supposed to be symmetric, the old variety of ﬁrm B is fully deter-






Table 1: The payoff matrix for negligible investment costs
the intensity of competition, the payoffs pi are correlated with the degree of competition
prevailing in the initial situation.
To analyse the effect of competition on the ﬁrms’ innovative activity, it is therefore de-
termined for which values of fA the four cases are a Nash equilibrium (NE). The appendix
proves the following proposition
Proposition 1. Given d < minft(6
p
2 7)=4;6tg, there exists a f
A(d), and a ¯ fA(d), with
f
A(d) < ¯ fA(d) and f
A; ¯ fA 2 (0;1=2), so that
(1) (np;np) is a NE for fA  ¯ fA
(2) (np;cr) and (cr;np) are NEs for f
A  fA < ¯ fA
(3) (cr;cr) is a NE for fA < f
A
The proposition states that both ﬁrms will undertake a product innovation if the initial
degree of competition is sufﬁciently high. In contrast, both ﬁrms will pursue the process
innovation if the initial level of competition is sufﬁciently low. For intermediate degrees
of competition, the ﬁrms pursue different types of innovation.
For an intuitive explanation, consider the extreme case of fA = 1=2. In this situation,
the ﬁrms produce identical varieties. They charge a price identical to the unit costs and
the proﬁts of both ﬁrms are zero. As a process innovation yields identical cost reductions,
ﬁrms continue to receive zero proﬁts after both introduced a more efﬁcient technology.
On the other hand, a product innovation guarantees a strictly positive proﬁt for both ﬁrms.
Consequently, it is proﬁtable for one ﬁrm to undertake a product innovation independent
of the rival’s actions. In this situation, case (1) states that the increase in the rival’s proﬁts
from developing a new variety is higher than the one resulting from a cost reduction given
the efﬁciency gain is comparable small. Case (1) veriﬁes that this result holds true for fA
in the neighbourhood of fA = 1=2, i.e. for a sufﬁciently high level of competition.
Withalowerinitialdegreeofcompetition, thepossibilityofchargingprices, whichex-
ceed the unit cost, increases. In those situations, case (2) conﬁrms that it is still proﬁtable
for one ﬁrm to pursue a product innovation independent of the rival’s decision. However,
the initial level of competition is low enough, so that the rival’s gain from introducing a
new technology is higher as compared to the one realised by offering a new variety.
Finally, consider the case of fA = 0, in which the initial level of competition attains
its minimum. As the maximal product differentiation is also the optimal one, a new
variety cannot be introduced. Firms can only introduce a more efﬁcient technology. As
investment costs are zero, it is true that the equilibrium (cr;cr) and an equilibrium, in
which neither ﬁrm undertakes any research project, yields identical proﬁts. However, the8 Pia Weiß
option ’do not invest at all’ is not credible, since a ﬁrm is strictly better off by developing
a new technology given the rival does not pursue a research project. Hence, the ﬁrms are
in a prisoner’s dilemma situation. Then, case (3) states that the prisoner’s dilemma arises
in the neighbourhood of fA = 0.
Not surprisingly, our results differ from those found by Bonanno and Haworth (1998).
This can be attributed to the different markets considered. Bonanno and Haworth (1998)
address the question for a market of vertically differentiated products. Here, the market
positions of the ﬁrms is not identical. Therefore, the results depend on whether the quality
leader or the quality follower innovates. In the model presented here, the ﬁrms are exactly
alike, so that neither ﬁrm has an advantage over the other.
Remark 4.1. In the present model, the second–stage product differentiation is always op-
timal in the sense that the ﬁrm produces the proﬁt maximising variety given the rival’s
actions. Since the optimal variety f
i is always the one located at the extreme end of
the variety line, the product choice is independent of the variety initially produced. As a
consequence, the ﬁrms can achieve a marginal or a large product innovation at the same
negligible investment costs. A more convincing assumption would e.g. be that only a
limited product innovation is feasible given the ﬁxed and negligible investment budget.
However, imposing the more plausible assumption leads to an increasingly inconvenient
notation without altering the results. Accordingly, the fact that the ﬁrms are able to de-
velop the proﬁt maximising variety may be seen as a pure notational convenience.
5 Non–negligible Investment Costs
In the previous section, it was assumed for simplicity that the investment costs are
zero. In this situation, ﬁrms always undertake one or the other research project. Clearly,
this situation will not generally be observed with strictly positive investment costs. There-
fore, this section investigates, under which circumstances proposition 1 continues to hold
with positive investment costs. Accordingly, the setup considered here is the same as
the one in the previous section. The investment costs are assumed to be strictly posi-
tive (Ii > 0), identical for product and process innovations, and identical for both ﬁrms
(IA = IB).
Firstly, observe that ﬁrms now have an additional option: not to invest at all. Conse-
quently, there are 5 potential NE in addition to the ones described in the previous section:
(1) (ni;ni): Neither ﬁrm undertakes a research project. This will typically be observed
when the investment costs are extremely high.
(2) (ni;np) and (np;ni): One ﬁrm carries out the product innovation and offers the
proﬁt maximizing variety f
i in the second stage. The other ﬁrm does not invest. As
both ﬁrms use the old technology, Dk equals zero.
(3) (ni;cr) and (cr;ni): One ﬁrm implements a new technology. The rival chooses to
do nothing and continues to use the old technology. Therefore, Dk equals  d and d
when ﬁrm B and ﬁrm A is the innovating one.Product and Process Innovations in Horizontally Differentiated Markets 9
ﬁrm B
ni np cr
ni (pI;pI) (pE;pF) (pG;pH)
ﬁrm A np (pF;pE) (pA;pA) (pB;pC)
cr (pH;pG) (pC;pB) (pD;pD)
Table 2: The payoff matrix for non–negligible investment costs
Since the investment costs are ﬁxed, the ﬁrms’ decision on the proﬁt maximising
variety when undertaking a product innovation remains unchanged. Therefore, ﬁrms seek
to maximise the degree of product differentiation, i.e. they choose f
A = 0 and f
B = 1
respectively. With this information and the ones given in the description of the cases, the
net payoffs for the potential NE can be determined from equations (4) and (5). Table 2
illustrates the potential outcomes of the investment game, where all payoffs are net of
investment costs. Once again, the payoffs prove to be symmetric, so that only the upper
or the lower triangle of the matrix need to be considered henceforward.
As in the previous section, the net payoffs will generally be functions of the efﬁciency
gain d and the old variety fA. In addition, the payoffs will typically depend on the in-
vestment costs as well. Hence, one would naturally presume that (ni;ni), where neither
ﬁrm undertakes a research project, is a NE for extremely high investment costs. As this
outcome is uninteresting, it is assumed that the investment costs are such that pF;pH >pI.
This condition is sufﬁcient to rule out (ni;ni) as a NE.
Note also, that the payoff matrix presented in table 1 reappears in the lower left part
of table 2. Consequently, the NE’s discussed in the previous section remain potential
outcomes of the investment game. In fact, the following proposition states the sufﬁcient
conditions, under which the results presented in proposition 1 continue to hold for strictly
positive investment costs.
Proposition 2. There exist parameters dAC, dBD, dDG, dDG and functions f
A(d), ¯ fA(d),




d 2 dAC\dBD\dDG\dBG; (8)
proposition 1 holds true for positive investment costs.
Proof. See appendix.
In fact, an investment environment identical to the one in the previous section is gen-
erated by conditions (7) and (8). Therefore, as long as these conditions are satisﬁed,
the innovation pattern is described by proposition 1 even though the investment costs are
strictly positive. Clearly, for investments costs sufﬁciently above the ones speciﬁed in
equation (7), multiple equilibria and corner solutions may arise, i.e. NE’s in which one of
the ﬁrms does not invest at all.
To illustrate the results, a numerical example is presented. Consider the following
parameter speciﬁcation: t = 1 and d = 0:2.10 Pia Weiß
Case 1. When investment costs are positive, the threshold values are derived with f
A =
0:23 and ¯ fA = 0:30. The restrictions on the efﬁciency gain d are found to be dAE = 0:37,
dBD = 6, dDG = 0:67, and dBG = 0:36. Condition (8) can be speciﬁed with d 2 [0;0:36].
Hence, an efﬁciency gain of d = 0:2 satisﬁes condition (8). For this cost reduction, the
upper limits of the investment cost are obtained with IAE(f
A)=0:05, IDG(f
A)=0:06, and
IBG(¯ fA)=0:09, so that condition (7) requires I 2[0;0:05). The boundaries still seem to be
strong. However, the lower limit for the investment costs, for which the ﬁrms will choose
not to invest rather than to pursue a process innovation (pI > pH) for fA = 0, equals 0:07.
This this condition is a prerequisite for the situation, in which neither ﬁrm undertakes an
investment, to be a NE.
6 Non–excluding Investment Projects
So far, the ﬁrms’ situation when deciding on the research projects was characterised
by two properties: (1) ﬁrms could only carry out one of them and (2) the investment costs
were independent of the scale of the research projects.9 Both may be an accurate descrip-
tion of the ﬁrm’s options under certain circumstances. One may associated these prop-
erties with short–term investment projects following a well–known technological path,
where only minor problems have to be solved. On the other hand, long–term investments
are typically more ﬂexible regarding the scale of the projects and the investment costs.
When a decision on the project scale is possible, the ﬁrms are in the position to pur-
sue both types of innovation. Therefore, this section relaxes the assumption of mutually
excluding investment projects as well as the one of ﬁxed–scale projects.
In particular, the initial situation is presupposed to be the same as described above:
both ﬁrms use identical technologies (cA = cB = c) and the market structure is symmetric
(fB = 1 fA). Firms decide on the characteristics of their research projects. Firm i
chooses a cost reduction Dci 2 [0;c] and the scale Dfi 2 [0;fi] of the product innovation
to be obtained. Let G(Dci) and K(Dfi) be the costs associated. The investment cost are
supposed to be increasing functions of the project scale, where the costs rise the more the
larger the scale is: G0() > 0, G00() > 0, K0() > 0, and K00 > 0.10 Clearly, when ﬁrms not
invest into a more efﬁcient technology or a new variety, the respective investment costs
are zero: G(0) = 0 and K(0) = 0.
As in the previous sections, the ﬁrms will aim at a higher degree of product differenti-
ation. Doing so decreases the competition and enables both ﬁrms to charge higher prices
at a given technological level. Therefore, ﬁrm A’s new variety is given by f
A = fA DfA,
whereas ﬁrm B’s new variety is determined with f
B = 1 fA+DfB.
Restricting attention to symmetric solutions, i.e. where DcA = DcB = Dc and DfA =
DfB = Df, the following result is derived:
9 In particular, this applies to the product innovation. Investment costs were the same whether the ﬁrm
aimed at a marginal change of the product characteristics or the proﬁt maximising ones.
10 The fact that the costs are separable implies that there are no externalities from pursuing both research
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Proposition 3. There exists a symmetric NE, where (Dc;Df) are determined by:
Dc =
(
0 if G0(0)  1=3;




0 if K0(0)  2t(2 q)=9;
fDf 2 [0;fA]jK0(Df) = 2t(2 2Df q)=9g otherwise;
(10)
with q = 1 2fA.
Proof. See Appendix.
The second lines of equations (9) and (10) specify the interior solutions of the in-
vestment game. Given that the ﬁrms invest into technology improvements, it can be
seen in equation (9) that the cost reduction is independent of the initial variety and,
hence, of the degree of competition. The efﬁciency gain is solely determined by the
properties of the investment cost function G(). From the second line of equation (10),
dDf=dq =  (2t=9)=(K00 +4t=9) < 0 ensues. This reveals that the size of the product
innovation is negatively correlated to the degree of product differentiation. This is a re-
sult of the ﬁrm’s inherent inclination to escape competition. If the level of competition is
initially high the ﬁrms has a high willingness to pay for relaxing competition.
The upper lines of equations (9) and (10) show the circumstances under which corner
solutions appear, i.e. when Dc, Df are zero. For both innovation types, ﬁrms will not
undertake a research project in the respective line when the ﬁrst unit of the innovation is
too costly. In particular, the ﬁrms will prefer the old technology, whenever G0(0)  1=3.
The upper limit for the investment cost of the ﬁrst unit are again independent of the degree
of competition. In the case of product innovations, the ﬁrms continue to produce the old
variety when K0(0)  2t(1 q)=9. Here, ﬁrms are prepared to incur higher investment
costs for the ﬁrst unit when competition is more intense. This resembles the ﬁndings of
the previous sections: product innovations are more proﬁtable when competition is high.
It can also be seen in (10) that the optimal change of the product characteristics in-
creases in the parameter t. This parameter is the consumers’ willingness to pay for vari-
eties differing from the most preferred one. Hence, the optimal product innovation Dfi is
positively correlated to the willingness to pay for sub–ideal varieties. In contrast, equation
(9) shows that the optimal degree of process innovation is independent of the consumers
willingness to pay for sub–ideal varieties.
Before relating the results to the literature, they are summarised.
– The ﬁrms will generally not invest when the investment costs for the ﬁrst unit are
too high.
– When ﬁrms undertake a process innovation, the scale of the project is independent
of the degree of competition.
– Firms are generally prepared to incur higher costs for product innovations when the
competition is initially more intense.12 Pia Weiß
– The willingness to pay (t) for varieties different from the ideal one and the optimal
degree of product innovation are inversely related.11
– Depending on the speciﬁc investment cost function, the symmetric NE may be a
situation in which
(1) no investments are pursued,
(2) only process innovations
(3) or only product innovations are carried out,
(4) both types of innovations are undertaken.
Rosenkranz (1996) addressed a similar question for horizontally differentiated prod-
uct market. Dissimilar from the present model, she studies a model where consumers
have a preference for product variety. From this difference in the setup ensue the diverg-
ing results concerning the optimal cost structure of the new technology. In Rosenkranz
the cost structure depends on the chosen variety whereas it has been demonstrated for
the present model that the optimal degree of cost reduction is independent of the initial
variety. In addition, in Rosenkranz’s contribution corner solutions are not analysed. In the
model presented here, ﬁrms may decide to pursue only one type of innovation or may as
well carry out none of them depending on the investment costs functions. The reason for
the diverging results lies in a slight difference of the setup. The model presented here pre-
sumesthatbothﬁrmsare alreadyoperatinginthemarketwhentheydecideon theresearch
projects. As a consequence, there is a status quo deﬁned by the pre–investment situation.
Then, the proﬁtability of an investment project depends also on the status quo. In partic-
ular, the after–innovation net proﬁts have to be higher than the pre–innovation proﬁts to
undertake a speciﬁc investment. As the latter are strictly positive in the present model,
the ﬁrms will not undertake every research project yielding a positive after–innovation
net proﬁt. In the setup of Rosenkranz, the ﬁrms start producing only after the innova-
tion. Hence, the ﬁrms will pursue every research project generating a positive net payoff
since there is no status quo. Presumably, corner solutions would arise even in Rosenkranz
(1996) contribution, when ﬁrms were active before the investment game starts or if R&D
costs were prohibitively high.
7 Summary
In a model of horizontally differentiated products, it was analysed how the degree
of competition affects the innovation pattern. A two–stage non–cooperative game was
employed, where ﬁrms decide on their research activities in the ﬁrst period and simulta-
neously choose prices in the second one.
11 A low value for the parameter t indicates a high willingness to pay for sub–ideal varieties. This can
be seen by setting t equal to zero in the individuals’ utility function. Then, the individuals do not care
about differences in the varieties and are prepared to pay the same price for all possible varieties.Product and Process Innovations in Horizontally Differentiated Markets 13
Three situations for the investment game were considered. In the ﬁrst, ﬁrms have to
choose between a product and a process innovation. The investment costs were supposed
to be zero. Here, it has been demonstrated that both ﬁrms develop a new variety when
competition is initially intense. In contrast, they will both pursue the process innovation
in an environment of low competition. For intermediate levels of competition the ﬁrms
undertake different innovation types. The second case reexamined this setting for strictly
positive investment costs. Conditions were established, under which the just described
innovation pattern emerges even with positive investment costs. Finally, a situation was
considered, inwhichﬁrmschoosethescaleoftheresearchprojects. Ithasbeenshownthat
corner solutions may arise, i.e. ﬁrms do not invest into a speciﬁc type of innovation if the
ﬁrst unit is too costly. When investment costs for both innovations types are moderate,
they will undertake process and product innovations at the same time. It has also been
demonstrated that the scale of the a product innovation and the willingness to pay for the
ﬁrst unit are the higher, the more intense the initial degree of competition is.
All speciﬁcations presented here assumed that innovation activities are not subject to
uncertainty. In particular, the completion date and the result of a research project are
highly uncertain in reality. Naturally, one would wish to model the innovation activity
as a stochastic process. However, the results stated in proposition 1 and 2 depend more
on the assumption that the investment costs are identical for both innovation types. Prob-
ably, equivalent results can be obtained as long as the stochastic process describing the
innovation processes is the same for both types.
Apart from incorporating uncertainty into the analysis, the model can be extended
in different respects. One would e.g. wish to study the effect of the market size on the
innovation pattern. This question was subject of the Rosenkranz (1996) contribution for
vertical product differentiation. Furthermore, one may be interested in the inﬂuence of
the preference parameters on the innovation activities.
Finally, one may wish to consider the present model in a market of vertical product
differentiation. Cremer and Thisse (1991) demonstrate that models of horizontal differ-
entiation satisfying certain conditions can be regarded as special cases of the Mussa and
Rosen (1978) type model of vertical product differentiation. As the model presented here
satisﬁes those conditions, the derived results will carry over to the Mussa and Rosen
(1978) type models.
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